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Abstract
Title of Dissertation:
A comparative study of the Combined Maritime
Force (CMF) and the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) aimed at maintaining
maritime security in the area of the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden

Degree:

Master of Science

Insecurity at sea is among the modern challenges affecting the maritime industry as
characterized by piracy, armed robbery, illicit fishing, drugs and human trafficking,
and pollution of the marine environment, among others. Terrorism, piracy, armed
robbery has particularly had adverse impact in international trade and global security.
Recently, the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden remain hot spots for armed
robbery and piracy against commercial ships. In relation to this, both the global
organizations and coastal governments operating around this region have established
different efforts in attempts to enhance security and safety of ships and crew. The
countries in this region also derive a significant proportion of their revenues from the
blue economy, including tourism, fishing, and drilling of minerals, among other
industrial activities at sea.
The countries in the region have developed and become members of regional and
international agreements in attempt to enhance security. This dissertation has explored
the effectiveness of some of these agreements in enhancing maritime security,
particularly the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and the Djibouti Code of Conduct
(DCoC). In the process, the paper has explored the existing national and international
legal framework in which the above treaties are based. The literature review section
has been based on systematic analysis of the existing knowledge regarding the
maritime industry, particularly in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.
The Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden region have been explored based on
how it uses the two tools to combat insecurity. The efforts of DCoC and CMF have
been explored on comparative manner. The effectiveness and robustness of the CMF
and DCoC have been assessed in a systematic manner in order to identify strengths
and limitations and provide the necessary recommendations.

KEYWORDS:
DCoC, CMF, Western Indian Ocean (WIO), Gulf of Aden,
Insecurity, Piracy, Armed Robbery, Illicit activities
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CHAPTER I
1. Introduction

1.1

Background and context

The area around the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean has a busy and thriving
maritime industry with busy ports and international trading zones. This requires the
establishment of effective maritime security forces to protect the maritime vessels and
personnel from different forms of insecurities including piracy, kidnapping, and armed
robbery. Additionally, maritime security is paramount, considering the growing
importance of oceans and related marine environment to humanity in the globalized
world (Swastika, 2018). In fact, apart from providing platforms for the transport of
large volumes of commodities, oceans and seas serve as important sources of
livelihood and food both for those in the region and globally via fisheries and tourism.
Therefore, security and order in these waters is an indirect source of wealth, facilitates
multiple activities on land, and is important for sustainable maritime wealth generation
and preservation of the ecosystem. Unfortunately, the security around the Indian ocean
continue to be threatened by growing criminal and illegal activities, especially armed
robbery and piracy targeted at international ships operating through the area.
Recently, global organizations and researchers have ranked insecurity caused by
armed robbers and pirates as the main threat to seaborne trade in the recent era. For
decades, the region has relied on IMO and related agreements, associations, treaties,
and instruments to strengthen security efforts (Swastika, 2018). Countries within the
region are also signatories to different international maritime organizations and
treaties. Usually, all the organizations and treaties are targeted towards reducing the
risks of insecurity affecting the maritime tourism and transport to improve
international cooperation and trade. In their effort to safeguard the maritime industry
and other domestic interests, the countries within the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian
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Ocean region have recently became signatories to the Djibouti Code of Conduct
(DCoC) and Combined Maritime Force (CMF).
1.1.2

History of Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)

The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) denotes a maritime partnership involving
multiple international bodies whose goal is to ensure that the International Rules Based
Order (IRBO) are upheld. The CMF is involved in promoting security and ensuring
stability and prosperity of member states in the high seas, especially along the shipping
lanes (Combined maritime Forces, 2020). The Combined Maritime Force mainly
concentrate on preventing piracy, ensuring safety in the marine environment by
fighting illegal non-state actors, counter narcotics, enhancing regional cooperation,
counter smuggling, and bringing together regional and various stakeholders to increase
their capabilities to enhance stability and security. Additionally, the CMF may also
help during the humanitarian and environmental crises if requested by the affected
parties. The Combined Maritime Force composes of three task forces including
Counter piracy force (CTF 151), Maritime Security Operations outside the Arabian
Gulf (CFT 150), and Maritime Security Operations inside the Arabian Gulf (CFT 152).
There are 33 countries that are part to the CMF, including: Saudi Arabia, Seychelles,
Singapore, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea,
Kuwait, Malaysia, Portugal, Qatar, UAE, United Kingdom, United States and Yemen,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines (Combined
maritime Forces, 2020). Member countries are united towards safeguarding the free
flow of ships and business, preventing illegal activities, and increasing maritime
security. The role of each member country differs depending on its resource capacity
and the availability of such as resources.

1.1.3

History of Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC)

The Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) is an international tool geared towards
safeguarding waterways in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden from
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robbery and related piracy of commercial ships. The DCoC was established in 2009
and the member countries include Egypt, Eritrea, Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emirates, Mauritius, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Seychelles, Somalia,
Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa, Jordan, Yemen, the Maldives, Comoros, and
Sudan (IMO, 2020). The main goal of the DCoC is to increase sharing of intelligence
and overall collaboration to prevent armed robbery and piracy, which had become a
major issue along the international waters of the Indian Ocean. Member states are
expected to monitor and share intelligence that can help to capture and prosecute
individuals and groups involved in piracy and other illicit activities. The member
countries are also required to facilitate the seizing of suspected ships and interdiction
of suspected perpetrators (IMO, 2020). To ensure ease and increase its effectiveness,
the DCoC has established certain guidelines and protocols that are used to select
experts to participate in their missions. DCoC has centers situated in multiple member
nations including Tanzania, Kenya, and Yemen.

1.2

Justification

Contemporary economies tend to depend heavily on international maritime transport
as a key pillar of international trade between countries, trade blocks and continents.
The western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden are important Maritime areas
characterized by large volumes of commercial ships, which has attracted different
forms crime and illegal activities over the years. Therefore, the countries in this region
require an effective maritime force and collaboration to prevent and address incidences
of maritime crimes. Multiple international laws as outlined under IMO guide the
management of waterways including the protection of maritime vessels and personnel
through the territorial waters. Each nation sharing ocean and seawaters is also charged
with the obligation of providing security for the vessels travelling legally through their
territories. Failure to provide the necessarily security could have immense negative
consequences to trade and other maritime activities such as fishing. The fact that a
single country may not have enough resources to guarantee adequate security around
it territories, forming an organization or security force becomes necessarily. For
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instance, the area within the Indian Ocean has become a major spot for pirates targeting
large ships. In order to protect the vessels, crew and cargo traversing the Western
Indian Ocean and Red Sea, countries within the region established the Combined
Maritime Force in 2009 (Brewster, 2016). The force was based on multiple resolutions
passed by the United Nations Security Council in regards to involving International
naval forces in preventing and stopping piracy and armed robbery of ships within the
area.

The International Maritime Organization further pushed for the establishment of the
DCoC to provide a legal reference point for nations and states around the western
Indian Ocean waters, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden. The effect of the DCoC
provisions in minimizing criminal activities around the Somalia territorial waters is
massive considering that the cases of piracy have reduced within the area in the last
few years. For instance, only less than five piracy attempts and attacks have been
documented in the last 8 years compared to over 100 incidences documented in 2011.
The creation of DCoC was based on a similar inter-governmental agreement
established in Asia called the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy
and Armed Robbery (RECAAP) (Brewster, 2016). While DCoD only involves nations
around the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden region, the Combined Maritime Force
involves countries across different continents. Additionally, the Combined Maritime
Force mainly concentrate on preventing piracy, ensuring safety in the marine
environment by fighting illegal non-state actors, counter narcotics, enhancing regional
cooperation, counter smuggling, and bringing together regional and various
stakeholders to increase their capabilities to enhance stability and security. While the
DCoC and the CMF share some similarities, their framework and mode of operation
differ significantly. By looking at the key principles and constituent of the DCoC and
CMF, this dissertation hopes to determine the effectiveness of each entity and provide
best recommendation to improve maritime security within the region under study.
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1.3

Main Objectives

The key goal of this paper is to study the role of the DCoC and the Combined Maritime
Force (CMF) based on their purpose and mode of operations in enhancing maritime
security. The paper hopes to achieve the following objectives:


To determine the interrelationship between CMF and DCoC



To determine the role of DCoC and CMF in their respective areas of operations



To determine the impact of CMF and DCoC’s ability to respond to maritime
insecurity



To assess the strengths and weaknesses of CMF &DCoC
1.4

Research Questions

In the context of the CMF and DCoC agreements, there is a need to carry out a
comprehensive examination to determine their effectiveness in enhancing security in
the area under study. The comparative analysis will use the available data to determine
the number of armed robbery attacks, piracy and other forms of insecurities targeted
on ships and other maritime vessels in the region the CMF and DCoC has helped to
prevent or stop since their implementation. This is very important towards improving
overall maritime security in the region and across the globe. The key research
questions the dissertation hopes to answer are:
1. Can regional agreements such as DCoC and CMF help tackle the existing and
emerging security threats in an ever-changing maritime environment?
2. What role does the DCoC and CMF agreement play in ensuring the stability of
the region where members or signatories have varying national and economic
interests?
3. What steps and legislations could be established to facilitate safe and conflictfree maritime activities in the region?
4. How have the CMF and DCoC been able to align its goals with the domestic
and international obligations of its members or signatories?
5. Are CMF and DCoC efficient and effective in supporting security effort of its
signatories and which between them is more suited to protecting the regions
maritime resources including waterways?
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CHAPTER II
2. Literature Review
2.1

Maritime Agreements and Tools to Curb Insecurity in the 21st Century

According to the Indian Ocean Commission (2019), the Indian Ocean is an important
geopolitical center that links trade paths in the Asia-Pacific region, Africa, Australia,
and the Middle East. The territory also possesses substantial amounts of regional,
national, and common valuable maritime resources that have contributed to the everincreasing insecurity issues including illegal fishing, piracy, trafficking of narcotics,
weapons, people, and other illegal things (Indian Ocean Commission, 2019). The
strategic value of the region is immense considering that it covers several continents.
According to CRIMARIO (2018), the Indian Ocean starts from the Southern part of
Africa, the Suez Canal to the north, and Antarctica in the South, and Australia and
Indonesian archipelago to the East. According to the International statistics, at least 40
percent of gas and half of global oil shipments are moved through the Indian Ocean.
Ports around the region handle at least 50 percent of global container shipments, which
translates to over 25 percent of the global trade (Bueger & Stockbruegger, 2016). Also,
in abundance are vital mineral resources including nickel, uranium, fishing stocks,
aluminium, and cobalt. Therefore, enhancing security in the Indian Ocean, especially
areas such as the Gulf of Aden, Bab el Mandeb, Malacca, and the Straits of Hormuz is
strategically important for the international flow of goods and services (Kraska, 2009).
This explains the numerous cooperation agreements and increased naval activities in
the area around the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean as illustrated by figure
1 below:
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Figure 1 Map of Western Indian Ocean
Source: hptt://www.africacenter.org/

The Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden also borders countries that has
experienced civil wars and related terrorist activists for decades including Sudan and
Somalia. These countries are adversely affected by lack of political stability due to
limited capacity to develop and enforce maritime policies. Consequently, illegal trade
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and related criminal activities have thrived in different parts of the region (Kraska,
2009). The fall of the government of the republic of Somalia, for instance, has largely
contributed to the rise in piracy and armed robbery, which is very rampant around the
coastline of Somalia. The insecurities posed by the criminals operating in the Somalia
coastline have gradually extended to other parts of the Indian Ocean. Multiple nations
with economic and political interests such as India, China, Russia, and the United
States have established naval centers within the area to counter these criminal activities
(Cordner, 2018). The security threats have also led to the establishment of several
agreements and instruments among the countries within the region and those with
interests in the area.
According to Cordner (2018), there are multiple treaties and conventions that date as
back as a century ago covering various maritime issues including illegal fishing and
protection of the environment. Other conventions are based on International guidelines
rather than regional cooperation. For example, the United Nations Conventions on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is an important global treaty that consists of more than 160
nations (Indian Ocean Commission, 2019). The treaty covers multiple maritime
security protocols in maritime terrorism, piracy, smuggling, environmental protection,
and illegal fishing. The Law of Sea is a detailed agreement that countries must
integrate in their national or regional security systems to ensure security in their
maritime territories in collaboration with the United Nations agencies (Bueger &
Stockbruegger, 2016). Other global instruments and treaties that were developed or
revised in the recent decades and meant to improve maritime security in the Western
Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden include:
1) The Security Council Resolutions 1816 (2008) and 1772 (2007), which were
derived from the United Nations’ Law of the Sea and meant to fight armed robbery
and piracy around the Somalia coastline (IMO, 2020).
2) The Convention for the Suppression of illegal activities, which is aimed at ensuring
safe navigation of ships, commonly known as the Rome Convention of 1988
(Kraska, 2009).
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3) International Maritime Organization (IMO) Code of Practice for the Investigation
of the Crimes of Armed Robbery and Piracy against ship, and
4) Safety of Life at Sea (SOALS) (Indian Ocean Commission, 2019).
2.1.1 Basis of the Agreements and Instruments
Maritime Agreements among countries in The Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of
Aden territory encompass nations such as Mauritius, Madagascar, South Africa,
Tanzania, Kenya, Comoros, Seychelles, the French foreign territory of Reunion,
Mozambique, and Somalia (CRIMARIO, 2018). The territory is a key international
center harbouring important naval activities and geopolitical interactions among
nations.

2.1.2 A Fact Sheet of the Western Indian Ocean
 The overall natural resources of the Western Indian Ocean are projected
to have an economic value exceeding 3000 billion US dollars (Indian
Ocean Commission, 2019)
 The waters have immense value to the human and animal lives in the area
 The yearly Gross Marine Product of the Western Indian Ocean is
estimated at over 20 billon US dollars
 Fisheries make up the largest wealth generator in the region, estimated
at 40 percent of the overall natural resources of the region, which
translates to more than 130 billion US dollars (CRIMARIO, 2018).
 The region has more than 60 million human inhabitancies just around its
coastal areas
 The population of people in majority of the nations with the area is
growing rapidly, hence the development of its coastal zones is expected
to grow immensely in the coming years
 The major contributors of development in the Western Indian Ocean and
the Gulf of Aden are service, construction, mining, and extractive zones,
especially the tourism and hospitality industries, and
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The Western Indian Ocean region enjoys a dense variety of animal and plant
species (IMO, 2020).

2.13 Security issues in the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden
According to Baruah (2018), the Western Indian Ocean has been experiencing its own
share of diverse, interlinked and complex traditional and non-traditional security
issues. The act of armed robbery and piracy has reduced since increased multi-national
naval operations around the East African territories since 2013 (Baruah, 2018).
Nevertheless, the region is still susceptible to periodic and radical terrorism conducted
by Somali pirates and international terrorism organizations such as Al-Shabaab. The
explosion of piracy and armed robbery against ships between 2008 and 2011 within
the Western Indian Ocean zones and in the Gulf of Aden have revealed that insecurities
at sea are interlinked and that the ability of individual states in the region are
inadequate to deter maritime crimes and to attain the developmental potential of the
region. Pirates from Somali have been conducting successful attacks against trade
ships and other vessels around the Tanzania, Kenya, Madagascar, and Seychelles areas
(Baruah, 2018). The insecurities in the region, which are not limited to piracy,
terrorism, or organized crimes, are evidently connected to political instabilities and
underdevelopment on land. The countries within the Western Indian Ocean regions
have tried different approaches to counter terrorism activities including enforcing
sanctions. However, most of the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) activities in the
area are carried out by international stakeholders and actor rather than by regional
actors (Bateman, 2016).

2.1.4 International Cooperation against insecurity in the WIO and Gulf of Aden
The table 1 illustrate Nature of cooperation in WIO region.

17

MASE Programme

The programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security (MASE) was
inaugurated in Mauritius in 2010. The MASE is operated under the partnership
with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and European
Union (EU) (Indian Ocean Commission, 2019). The programme is fully
financed by the European Union and jointly enforced by the East African
Community

(EAC),

the

Indian

Ocean

Commission

(IOC),

the

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) (Baruah, 2018). The main
goal of MASE is to reinforce the capacity of the Western Indian Ocean and the
Eastern and Southern Africa regions to ensure maritime security as part of the
Regional Action Plan and Strategy against piracy (Bueger & Stockbruegger,
2016).
Jeddah amendment

In 2017, a high-level delegation met in the city of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia with

to the Djibouti

the main goal of amending the Djibouti code of conduct (DCoC). The updated

Code of Conduct

version recognizes the importance of the Blue economy such as seafaring,

(DCoC+)

shipping, tourism, and fisheries in creating sustainable development of the local
and regional

economies,

stability, creating employment,

and food

security (Indian Ocean Commission, 2019). The new version is founded on the
initial code of conduct adopted in 2009 and emphasizes on the need for full
cooperation between signatory nations towards preventing transitional
maritime terrorism, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and other
organized crimes. One of the most important clauses contained in the (DCoC+)
is the willingness of the signatory states to establish and enforce a national plan
to facilitate growth of the maritime sector and ensure a sustainable maritimebased economy that is capable of producing stability, revenue and employment
(Baruah, 2018). The meeting at Jeddah involved different key stakeholders
derived from the original DCoC signatory nations together with observers from
East African Standby Force (ASF), European Union, France (Reunion),
Interpol, and UNODC.
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Africa Integrated

AIMS 2050 is an attempt by the African Union to play a larger role in ensuring

Maritime Strategy

the stability of its waters for the benefit of its people. The plan is geared towards

(AIMS)

increasing the economic benefits derived from the Africa’s inland waterways,
seas, and Oceans by creating a flourishing maritime economy and tapping the
maximum potential of the blue economy activities in a sustainable way. The
continent’s overall coastline is estimated at over 26000 nautical miles,
including several islands (Baruah, 2018). More than 35 African territories are
island or coastal countries while over 50 of its ports are heavily involved in
international trade through cargo and container handling. Although the number
of ships owned by Africans is merely 2 percent of the global ship population,
which translate to less than 1% gross tonnage, the ports of Africa receive at
least 6 percent of global water-based cargo traffic and an estimated three
percent of global container handling (Bueger & Stockbruegger, 2016).
The African Union is in the process of enforcing the 2050 AIMS
strategy in partnership with the international, regional, and local regulatory
frameworks. Evidently, the AIMS are quite a huge undertaking, but its success
will increase the viability of Africa’s maritime environment, which will
translate to immense growth (Baruah, 2018). Undivided commitment and
increase partnership and coordination between member nations, regional
mechanisms, local communities, RECs, and the larger global community are
needed. Additionally, maritime policy-makers claims that AIMS as a detailed
strategy will help to harness the wealth found within the African waters through
enhanced maritime governance, which will in turn improve the security
situation in the Western Indian Ocean region (Brewster, 2016).

Djibouti Code of

The DCoC is focused on preventing and fighting Armed Robbery and Piracy

Conduct (DCoC)

against maritime vessels in the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean. The
code was developed in 2009 and comprises of 20 nations as listed above
(Baruah, 2016). The code of conduct offers a model for capacity building in the
region, especially in regards to reducing incidences of piracy. The DCoC
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remains the first ever code to be put in place in the area of Western Indian Ocean
(Baruah, 2018).

Table 1. Nature of cooperation in WIO region
Source: Different security agreements in the Western Indian Ocean region elaborated by the author.

2.15 African littorals security partners in the Western Indian Ocean and the
Gulf of Aden
According to Baruah (2018), India’s policy makers and related experts have seen
it important for their country to increase its influence in the Western Indian
Ocean maritime region by collaborating with the local states to increase
maritime security. Hence, India’s emphasize on increasing its cooperation with
Western Indian Ocean’s littorals in maritime issues is of greater importance
because its strategic location and abundant of untapped maritime resources
(Baruah, 2018). East African littorals that are rich in natural resources are
increasingly focusing on their blue economy around the Indian Ocean to help
attain sustainable development and growth. Countries such as Mauritius, South
Africa, Tanzania, Kenya, Comoros, Seychelles, Madagascar, Somalia, and
Mozambique have become signatories to the 1997’s Indian Ocean Rim
Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), currently referred as the
Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) (Baruah, 2016). Additionally, India has
become an important maritime security partner for multiple African lit toral
nations through the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), which was
established in 2008 (CRIMARIO, 2018). The IONS comprise of six African
nations, namely Tanzania, South Africa, Seychelles, Kenya, Mozambique, and
Mauritius. From the IONS document, India decision to collaborate with these
African states was mainly motivated by the deteriorating security in the Western
Indian Ocean regions, especially after the surge of piracy and armed robbery of
ships. A similar proactive strategy in India aimed at improving the maritime
security in African waters is also found under its Maritime Strategy Report of
2015, which also details several areas of cooperation (Baruah, 2018).
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2.1.6 CMF and DCoC’s efforts in the region
2.1.6.1 Mission and Vision of CMF and DCoC
Mission


Promote capacity building to help develop maritime sector and minimize or
even stop threats of armed robbery and piracy



Respond to humanitarian and environmental issues under the request of
member states



Enhance overall stability and security of maritime environment in the region
(Benbow, 2015).

Vision


To carryout security operations to safeguard maritime resources



To increase stability in the region, especially in regards to the development of
the blue economy



To facilitate increase collaboration among member states



To provide a framework to help members to adapt to changing maritime
environment (Benbow, 2015)

The CMF and DCoC’s security strategy towards the WIO and the Gulf of Aden is
based on several principles including training, hydrographic surveys, economic
development, and anti-piracy operations. First, the DCoC and CMF are highly
involved in training of maritime security personnel, naval forces, and civilian
personnel involved in the management of maritime resources. The Naval Institute of
Educational and training Institute of India and the Marine science Academy of Saudi
Arabia have contributed immensely in training the African nations under the DCoC
(Geiß & Petrig, 2011). The DCoC has also been in highly involved in enhancing the
hydrographic capabilities of its African members. This is being achieved through
regional and international cooperation involving countries such as Japan and India.
Hydrographic partnership already exists between India and DCoC’s signatories such
as a Tanzania, Mauritius, Kenya, Mozambique, and Seychelles. In regards to increase
security around the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, the CMF continue to
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carry out anti-piracy and anti-robbery operations (Kraska & Wilson, 2009). The WIO
and the Gulf of Aden are key routes for the international trade, with an estimated value
of trillions of dollars annually. The Combined Maritime Force has continued to
conduct anti-piracy operations since the past decade. Apart from the continuous
patrols, the naval forces under CMF also help to escort large ships across the armed
robbery and piracy hotspots along the Gulf of Aden. Not a single ship has been robbed
or hijacked since the CMF increased its operations in the region. The DCoC has also
played a significant role in continued development of ports as part of enhancing
maritime diplomacy. The CMF have also increased their visits and monitoring of ports
within the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, especially Indian Ocean Island
and East African states. The increased operations have helped to boost greater synergy
and inter-operability between the coast guards of individual countries and the CMF
(Kraska & Pedrozo, 2013). The consistent port monitoring also shows CMF’s
willingness to enhance the development of blue economy of its signatory states.
2.1.6.2 The Role of DCoC in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden
The Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden is an important territory for the world
maritime industry since it serves the Middle East, Asia and Africa. The complexity of
the WIO and the Gulf of Aden’s maritime sector has attracted different challenges,
including difficulties associated with dealing with the busy transport sector, armed
robbery and piracy against ships (Geiß & Petrig, 2011). This has created the need for
strong partnership between the various players involved in the maritime industry.
Furthermore, the transnational nature of maritime crimes such as drug and human
trafficking makes it important for regional and international cooperation. The fact that
individuals perpetrate crimes in the region and groups from different countries,
together with the fact that hijacked vessels are taken to different jurisdiction, demands
that countries within the WIO and the Gulf of Aden collaborate with other countries
to minimize or even stop such crimes (Kraska & Pedrozo, 2013). Bearing in mind all
problems that the region faces in addressing the transnational illicit and criminal
activities, being a signatory to DCoC is important. Importantly, being a signatory to
DCoC has provided the countries with a model for preparedness and for effective
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response to armed robbery, piracy, environmental pollution, human trafficking, arm
smuggling, and illegal fishing, among others.
To begin, being members of the DCoC, countries in WIO and the Gulf of Aden has
been able to communicate and share intelligence, which has been fundamental in
reducing criminal attacks in ships. More so, being a signatory of DCoC, these countries
continue to get assistance in investigating, arresting, and charging of culprits of
maritime crimes in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. This has increased
security and safety of vessels and crews involved in the international trade(Geiß &
Petrig, 2011). Overall, the DCoC has been critical to the region by increasing
partnership among member countries. The Djibouti code of conduct has facilitated
efforts to reduce the occurrence and scope of the transnational crimes, translating to
improved business environment for member nations. With the corridor being a vital
maritime transport hub, the sound trade environment has increased the value of
maritime resources, which is important for the continued development of the blue
economy. Therefore, members of the DCoC have started to earn additional millions of
dollars from the shipping industry, oil business, fishing, and even tourism (Geiß &
Petrig, 2011). The safe shipping environment has also contributed to the increased
import of important foods and industrial raw materials, a reality that continue to
enhance the economic, social and political power of the countries in the region.
According to the Indian Ocean Commission (2019), the Djibouti Code of Conduct has
in particular facilitated the training of officials from the member states in regards to
security, safety issues, and protection of the maritime environment for sustainable blue
economy development. DCoC-based education and training encompass taking the
officials through rigorous techniques to equip them with the skills to identify and
address illicit and criminal activities in their maritime territories (Indian Ocean
Commission, 2019). This has increased the preparedness of the stakeholders in the
relevant nations to tackle different challenges, which has helped to increase efficiency
in response to attacks. Additionally, adopting and implementing the maritime security
model created by the DCoC, signatory states has further been able to expand their
maritime legislations to facilitate easy and smooth sharing of information, arrest and
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prosecution of maritime criminals (Devakumar, 2017). Generally, the code has been
critical in improving legislations of member states, especially in regards to human
trafficking, illegal fishing, armed robbery and piracy at sea.
2.1.6.3 CMF’s Role in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden
The Combined Maritime Force is based on partnership among different States with the
goal of preventing piracy, maritime terrorism, promoting a sound maritime
environment, and enhancing collaboration among members. The CMF is led by the
United States, Canada and the European Union, among other allies with the main goal
of securing international maritime territories around the horn of Africa and related
nations. Three regional task forces make up the CMF, including CTF 150, CTF 151,
and CTF 152, which are charged with counterterrorism, counter-piracy, and security
missions around the Gulf, respectively (Holmes, 2011). Through the CMF framework,
different nations have provided resources to be used in security operations in the
Western Indian Ocean, the red sea, the Gulf of Oman and the Gulf of Aden, among
other hot spot areas. The CMF’s responsibility in the WIO and the Gulf of Aden is
mainly that of fighting armed robbery and piracy against maritime vessels, especially
the large ships that for years has been targeted by Somali pirates. In fact, most maritime
problems in the region are associated with insurgencies groups such as Alshabab who
conduct armed robbery and piracy for financial reasons.

The CMF has also helped to reduce terrorism attacks by rebel groups such as the
Houthi around the Gulf of Aden. The counter-armed robbery, terrorism and piracy
operations by the member states are aligned to CMF’s responsibility to counter and
prevent such criminal activities (Kraska & Wilson, 2009). The success of the naval
forces, which are derived from different signatories, is based on effective and timely
sharing of intelligence under the CMF guidelines. Furthermore, the capacity of the
CMF members to counter attacks has been enhanced in the last decade through
capacity building efforts provided under the CMF framework (Kraska & Wilson,
2009). Therefore, based on the increased collaboration, members of the CMF in WIO
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and the Gulf of Aden are guaranteed a decrease in the number of threats caused by
terrorists, pirates, and illicit fishers, since security has become a responsibility of all
signatories of DCoC and CMF. Overall, CMF continue to play a critical function in
ensuring stability and security in the shipping industry, translating to economic
stability and growth in the area.

2.2

Combating maritime Insecurity: Operational concept

Having a legal structure alone is not enough to ensure maritime security, especially
when dealing with illicit and criminal activities such as piracy at sea. Furthermore,
legislations only create a ground to address different issues thus a mode of
implementing the legislation framework is critical. The combined task force provides
both the framework to detect, safeguard, and respond to the security risks. According
to Devakumar (2017), operational responses to insecurity and other challenges facing
the maritime sector requires personnel and technical resources to facilitate close watch,
monitoring and control measures within the affected area. Considering these factors in
operational responses and bearing in mind the nature of the risks to maritime security
against ships, elements of risk management such as preparedness, mitigation,
prevention, and recovery are vital. This makes the Combined Maritime Force effective
when responding to these illicit and illegal activities within the WIO and the Gulf of
Aden (Devakumar, 2017). Therefore, the four elements of risk management should
create the reference point or ground for effective response to armed robbery and piracy
at sea. In regards to readiness or preparedness, the capacity of the signatory states to
respond to insecurities at sea is enhanced through consistent training. This ensures that
the members can identify and raise alarm before the occurrence of the crime. The
readiness measures under the CMF are based on partnership and joint coordination
among members (Benbow, 2015). The availability of equipment, work force, and
technical platforms is critical to ensure coordinated identification, monitoring and
management of the illicit or criminal activities.
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Training also contributes immensely to the success of CMF since it provides the muchneeded skilled work force. Mitigation and prevention of security risks at sea is the core
function of CMF. Steps are taken early enough to discourage and deter illicit and
criminal activities within the maritime territories (Benbow, 2015). Response to
incidences of maritime crime involves immediate or ongoing operations depending on
the nature and scope of the incidences in play. The CMF starts by creating an
operational plan to rescue the crew of ship, apprehend the criminals, and transport
them ashore for legal action and medical attention (Benbow, 2015). On the other hand,
post incident reaction is aimed at restoring the situation to the same or even better
situation than it was before the insecurity incidences. This also involves post
management of the ship and the affected crew to ensure that they return safely offshore
and to their respective countries (Devakumar, 2017). Generally, the goal of an
operational response to insecurity at sea against ship is to establish, the necessarily
plan to create awareness and facilitate easier and faster detection of risks. This includes
putting in place the needed resources to deal with these risks, to deter and minimize
their occurrence, and to tackle them when they take place.
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CHAPTER III
3. Results and Analysis
3.1

Comparative analysis of DCoC and CMF

Insecurity in the maritime territories has existed for centuries, but the 21st century has
experienced a significant increase in armed robbery and piracy against ships traversing
the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Insecurity has destabilizing impacts
on corporations, governments, and the overall region. Initially, the region had to rely
on the global agreements established in the 20th century, despite the continued
evolution of maritime crimes. Additionally, the fight against armed robbery, piracy,
and other illicit activities at sea is grounded on legislations created during the 1980s
that continue to be updated to match the present situation and diverse locations. DCoC
and CMF agreements have particularly become important in combating insecurity
within the region around the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. This part
outlines and analysis the success and challenges of the Djibouti Code of conduct and
the Combined Maritime Forces in their efforts to combat insecurity in the Western
Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden since their inception.

3.1.1 Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)
The Combined Maritime Force comprises of 30 signatory states and is aimed at
enhancing the stability, security and overall growth of the covered regions and member
states. The force cover and estimated area of more than 2 million square miles within
the International waters. CMF is led by the Vice Admiral of the United States Navy
while the Commodore of the Royal Navy (RN) serves as the deputy leader (Combined
Maritime Forces, 2019). The CMF is made up of three units: the counter piracy (CTF151), the Arabian Gulf security and cooperation (CFT-152), and counter terrorism
(CTF-150). The operations of the CTF-152 are mainly concentrated within the Arabian
Gulf, while the CTF-151 AND CTF-152 operates the area from the Suez Canal all the
way to the south of the Indian Ocean. The treaty leading to the formation of the CMF
does not make it compulsory for members to take part in its operations, but members
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can volunteer. The Combined Maritime Force was created under the United Nations
Security Council resolution of 2010, commonly known as (UNSCR1373 (2) (Elgort et
al., 2012). Policy makers and experts have since 2006 been involved in different areas
of the force as it continues to reinvent its tactics. A majority of these experts have
highlighted absence of documentation, which makes it difficult to analyse its
operations.

3.1.1.1 CTF-151 and counter Piracy
The continued political volatility and instability in the region around the Somalia
waters since the 1990s has created motivations and an environment that around piracy
to thrive. After periodic armed robbery and piracy attacks in the beginning of the
2000s, criminals from the Somali territory started to capture and hold ships and crew
in ransom successfully, especially in 2005. These attacks eventually led to the 2008’s
establishment of the UNSCR 1816, which allowed foreign naval ships to carry out
operations within the Somali territorial waters and surrounding regions. The United
Nations resolution also allowed the combined naval forces to use all force necessarily
to deal with illicit crimes in the area. Different groups came forward to help, leading
to the establishment of the CTF-151 of the Combined Maritime Forces in 2009. In the
August of 2009, NATO conducted 508 patrols within the region as part of the
Operation Ocean Shield. In 2008, the EUNAVFOR under the European Union Naval
Forces conducted operation Atalanta, which led to the rescue of several hostages
(Riddervold, 2018).
Historical data and computer simulation have evidently contributed immensely to the
successful operations of CMF via forecasting of areas under high risk of piracy attacks,
definition of force operation areas, weather conditions and density of ship traffics, and
spatial analysis of ongoing piracy attacks in the International Recognized Transit areas
(IRTC). Simple simulations are done to determine the size of the patrol areas
(Laxhammar & Falkman, 2010). This approach is mainly grounded on the need for
exposure of the operation area to dense military resources to intervene during
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problematic time effectively. The operations often involve the naval ships receiving a
signal or call from a maritime vessel under distress, then sending the message to the
helicopters that always on standby. Upon arriving at the scene, the helicopter or the
warships give warning shots that enough to prevent the attack. The size of the
operation areas allows the responding helicopter to arrive at the area of distress within
less than an hour after the alert call. The naval ships are usually used to cut off the
vessels used by the criminals. Unfortunately, most of the operations conducted by the
CMF go unreported and sometimes undocumented for public consumption.

The limited documentation of patrols in this area are found under the NATO center for
Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE). The decrease in illicit activities in
the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden has been associated with a number of
factors including the existence of EUNAVFOR, the adoption of Best Management
Practices (BMP) by merchant ships, NATO and the operations of CMF (Riddervold,
2018). The CMF has increased its security forces around the Somali territories, which
is also characterized by empowerment of coast guard through increased arming and
training. Evidently, a majority of the sources of insecurity remains, and naval presence
is slowly decreasing. For instance, the CMF only deploys patrol vessels less frequently
today compared to the period before 2013. During the absence of surface military
vessels, maritime operations helicopters fly sorties while systems to counter-piracy
partners and situational alert models continue to exist, especially due to the political
volatility in Somalia (Laxhammar & Falkman, 2010). Therefore, the CMF has to
continue monitoring the region within the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean,
especially when it comes to examining the conditions facilitating the periodic
reoccurrence of insecurity.

3.1.1.2 CTF-150 and Maritime Security
Assessing the overall success of the operations of CTF-150 is quite difficult,
considering its main goal of enhancing maritime security, prevent and prohibit of the
utilization of maritime territories for terrorism activities. CMF has opened up on its
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plan to shape situations ashore as one way of dealing with illicit activities at sea
(Combined Maritime Forces, 2020). This including moving some of its patrols,
including weapons and personnel on land to counter criminals before they enter the
maritime vessel pathways. Recently, the most apparent element of this plan has been
the outlawing of large maritime transportation of hashish and heroin. Their linkage to
the financing of terrorist activities has mainly informed the banning of large shipment
of narcotics within Somalia and surrounding areas. The movement of weapons meant
to support terrorism activities in the area is also of great concern (Morash, 2004).
The United Nations has identified the smuggling and export of charcoal within the
East African region as one of the sources of funding for maritime crimes. A major
beneficiary of the illicit activities is the Al Shabaab, a terrorism group that is greatly
rooted in Somalia (Devakumar, 2017). The CTF-150 has made multiple seizures of
narcotics along the western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden, particularly around the
Hash Highway and Smack Track as illustrated by figure 2 below.

Figure 2. Operation area for Combined Maritime Forces

Source: http://www.combinedmaritimeforces.com/
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A significant amount of narcotics originating from Afghanistan and other Middle East
nation often finds their way in ships travelling along the Western Indian Ocean and
Gulf of Aden regions, especially around the Makran Coast and later transferred to
smaller boats. The heroin is usually destined for East Africa and later smuggled into
Europe and the United States while Hash is meant for the nations around the Arabian
Peninsula (Ece, 2015). Since its creation, the Combined Maritime Force has seized
tones of the illegal drugs as illustrated by figure 3 below.

Figure 3. Drug seizures by CMF
Source: http://www.combinedmaritimeforces.com/

Whereas the rise in seizures is part of the approach by CMF to enhance maritime
security in the region, the typical assessment of the real effectiveness of CMF in line
with these seizures is still difficult. Probably, the main idea in regards to the
effectiveness of the combined force is grounded on its ability to minimize narcotic
business in the region through its periodic operations (Riddervold, 2018). Figure 4 and
figure 5 below compares data originating from UNODC, which is the department of
United Nations, charged with the responsibility of dealing with production of narcotics
and drug-related crime and data from the CMF. It is vital to note that only the data
involving the tracking of heroin and opium from the Afghanistan is readily available,
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hence the reason for considering it. Generally, the overall size of the heroin captured
within the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden have reduced by 50 percent
since increased operations by CMF between 2009 and 2012 (Benbow, 2015).
However, the tones of drugs intercepted during CMF operations have increased
significantly. Whereas the general picture is quite concerning, there is evidence that
the presence of CMF in the region has had a significant positive impact in reducing
the frequency of drug trade. Additionally, the extent of criminal activity disruptions
by CMF in the region has grown by up to 15 times from the average of 20 kg to 300
kg (Clark, 2006).

Figure 4. Estimated annual Afghanistan opium cultivation and production (UNODC)

Source: http://www.unodc.org/

Figure 5. narcotics and drug-related crime and data from the CMF
Source: http://www.combinedmaritimeforces.com/
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Several factors should be considered when assessing the efficiency and effectiveness
of the seizures carried by the Combined Maritime Force in order to increase accuracy
of the findings. The model used by the UNODC to measure the overall narcotic
production is vital, however, determining the amount of revenue from narcotics that is
used to fund piracy and other maritime crimes require more data from law enforcement
and intelligence agencies (Benbow, 2015). This also includes estimating the
proportion of narcotics and other illicit drugs that reaches overseas through land, which
is very difficult. Although there is no doubt that patrols by CMF may be helping to
deter illicit activities in western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, the continued civil
wars characterized by political conflict around Syria, Iraq, Sudan, and Somalia has
also played a significant role (Benbow, 2015). The regular mass movement of refugees
within the region led to increased security within borders, which made the routes less
attractive to terrorists and maritime criminals. The 2015 Afghanistan Opium Survey
by the UN provides evidence of how tighter border control may have shaped the
behaviours of pirates, smugglers, and armed robbers (Devakumar, 2017). It is also
important to take into account other measures being taken by the CMF that could have
contributed to reduced insecurity with the area under study. For example, it is
important to consider the amount seized and frequency of seizures in a given period or
number of operations in a certain area. It also possible to even arriving at a significantly
precise measure.

3.1.2

Recent successful CMF Operations

In the first half of 2010, the 150 unit of the Combine Task Force carried out a security
operation in the Bab AL Mandab sea regions of the Western Indian Ocean and the
Gulf of Aden. The maritime security operation resulted to major success for the CTF
150 and the overall CMF in building of maritime Pattern of Life (POL) (Combined
Maritime Force, 2020). Joint forces from the United States and the United Kingdom
together with Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA) and German Maritime Patrol were
critical factor in this achievement. Apart from the regional engagement, more
emphasis was put in the gathering of data in regards to maritime pattern of life,
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enhancing partnership with stakeholders in Yemen and using the information provided
by the Yemen Naval officials on maritime environment and related local issues
(Combined Maritime Force, 2020). The security operation also involved engagement
with war vessels from the Royal Saudi Naval Forces (RSNF) by two ships, HMS
Makkah and HMS Riyadh. The maritime security operation carried to reinforce the
key elements of violent extremism, human smuggling, anti-terrorism, illegal trade, and
narcotic smuggling, among other illicit activities. Key officials from the CTF 150 unit
also toured Yemen to meet key military figures such as Major General Ahmed Ali AlAshwai to enhance the regional activities of CTF 150 (Combined Maritime Force,
2020). As a multidimensional team, one of the CTF 150 main responsibilities is to
implement counter-terrorism activities on the high waters. It executes security
operations in the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, and
the Gulf of Oman.

At the end of 2018, a sub-unit of theCTF-150 called the HMS Dragon carried out the
biggest drug bust since the creation of the Combined Maritime Forces. The operation
led to the seizure and destruction of almost 10000 kilograms of illegal drugs being
ferried in small boats within the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden
(Combined Maritime Force, 2020). Without the operation by the CMF, the narcotics,
which are estimated at more than 5 million pounds, could have been sold to the locals
in the region. The profits from such illegal activities could have further been used to
fund terrorism and different organized crimes (Combined Maritime Force, 2020). The
HMS unit is headed by Commodore Darren Garnier from the Canadian Navy, who for
years has helped to conduct successful security operations and patrol in the East
African and Middle Eastern areas of the WIO and the Gulf of Aden. The capture and
destruction of these drugs are helping to reduce the financial capacity of criminals and
terrorists. Nevertheless, it has been easy for the Combined Maritime Forces during
these operations since they have to deal with bad weather and highly armed criminals
with good knowledge of the area. The task force uses Wildcat helicopter to carry the
captured narcotics to the CMF war vessels (Combined Maritime Force, 2020). The
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helicopter does not only help to speed up the process of transporting the drugs but also
in the recovery of Royal marines and sailors working with the HMS Dragon sub-unit.

3.1.3

CMF and Force Flow

Force flow denotes the number of maritime vessels linked to each unit of the CMF in
a single day. Considering that signatories to the CMF provide their support on a
voluntary basis, force flow usually acts as a metric for determining the commitment of
the CMF signatories. The number of assets of a given country is calculated in terms of
the assets available at a given day, and assessed frequently through the Effectiveness
Assessment Campaigns (Devakumar, 2017). Documentation and reporting is done for
every vessel including its country of origin, which allows for further analysis of the
resources available to the CMF. However, the assessment of the force flow is
complicated by the problems associated with determining the value of each asset due
to varying size and regularity of operation or availability for use by the task force. The
contributions of some nations using other resources other than vessels hinder fair
assessment of the relative effectiveness of the CMF, especially due to the voluntary
clause. Therefore, maritime security scholars and experts have examined the force
flow data through simplistic approaches in relation to the operations of the CMF (Papa
et al., 2015). Therefore, the results of the effectiveness of CMF based on the force flow
can be measured using two approaches.
The first approach focuses on the number of resources provided by each member using
some modifier or multiplier to show their capacity. The other approach replaces the
resources with the size covered by the CMF security patrols. Unfortunately, the first
approach is difficult to implement because it requires one to develop multipliers for
assessing the relative capacity that is both fair and satisfactory. The multipliers must
also take into account all the situations involved (Pallotta et al., 2013). For the second
approach, one proposal is to determine the number of hours used in operations in each
given area. Whereas combined task forces are not always carrying out patrols, they
often prioritize certain areas. The second approach is less complex to use.
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Nevertheless, this does not mean that the approach will yield fair result since different
vessels may have outrageously varying sensor ranges between them and aircrafts
(Pallotta et al., 2013). The approach also does not take into account the gap between a
vessel that is in active operation and high-speed vessels transiting via the region. For
instance, figure 6 capture vessels conducting CFT-150-related operations in a
particular day, encompassing an Australian replenishment vessel, a USN guidedmissile destroyer, an RN air - defence destroyer, a US Coast Guard Cutter, and USN
patrol boat. It is evident that these assets in form of patrol vessels hold varying
capabilities (Melvin, 2019).

Figure 6. Vessels conducting CFT-150-related operations
Source: http://www.combinedmaritimefirces.com/

Therefore, like the DCoC, the CMF should find areas where partnership between
countries can take place such as blue economy for sustainable security. According to
Benbow (2015), although most of CMF’s activities are based on security operations
of the combined naval forces, substantial operations in regards to governance should
also be carries out in order to ensure sustainable growth, without compromising on
environment and economic health (Pallotta et al., 2013). Activities relating to the blue
economy, including those that involve preserving the marine environment by working
with the local fishermen and neighbouring communities usually help to enhance

36

maritime security. Although a number of stakeholders, including the African Union,
have consistently focused on the relationship between the blue economy and the
maritime security, the CMF appear to treat them separately (Melvin, 2019). Dealing
with insecurities at sea, safeguarding the marine environment, and extracting the
maritime resources in a sustainable way is dependent in clear understanding of all
dimensions of the maritime sector.

For instance, research on fishing trends and marine life carried out in the recent years
by different environmental agencies has provided important insights into the different
spheres of maritime. These studies are important in identifying anomalies at sea
(Melvin, 2019). Therefore, it is important for the CMF to adopt a working plan to bring
together environmental agencies and coastal communities for effective eradication of
illicit and illegal activities that contribute to insecurity at sea. For instance, the area of
fisheries and the interests of different countries have often let to conflicts due to the
economic and environmental issues involved. Enhancing the ties between
environmental, security and development experts has a higher chance facilitating the
growth of blue economy, environmental conservation, and overall maritime security.

3.2

The Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC)

The Djibouti Code of Conduct is part of the team that is fully involved in the
development and implementation of frameworks to increase the capacity to prevent
and fight insecurity in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. According to
IMO, the DCoC has at least 20 signatories from the region (Hensel, 2017). However,
like CMF, the DCoC also depends on the goodwill and cooperation of its member
nations in security efforts. Usually, the DCoC is heavily involved in ensuring
cooperation, coordination and communication among signatories, which are also
strongly aligned to its key founding principles. These key principles include
strengthening of national laws, training, developing capacity, and sharing of
intelligence both regionally and nationally. DCoC has also developed strong technical
partnership with the International Maritime Organization (IMO). This partnership has
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been effective in increasing trust among members and abilities of DCoC to counter
insecurity in the region, especially armed robbery and piracy. The Djibouti Code of
Conduct prioritizes capacity building as a key instrument in the fights against armed
robbery and piracy in the area.

As a result, sharing of intelligence, governance, and training are implemented in
different ways to build a strong model of countering insecurity. Additionally, the
partnership between DCoC and IMO has led to the establishment of a regional training
center, which is currently situated in Djibouti. The training center was built using
donor funds with Japan being the main contributor. Even the training facilitated by the
DCoC is carried out under joint efforts of multiple International organizations
including East African Standby Forces (EASF), European Union and NATO (Hensel,
2017). Evidently, training as a capacity building tool has been effective in reducing
piracy activities in the area around the Somali territorial waters. The Code has ensured
that the security efforts are in line with the local legislations of the member states,
including the classification of illegal and criminal activities at sea. This form of
empowerment allows individual governments to carryout independent investigations
and charges the perpetrators in their court systems following the global standards
outlined by IMO. The intelligence sharing facilities are situated in Dar-AL-Salaam,
Mombasa and Sanaa (Siebels, 2019). These enters are fully equipped to enhance
collaboration between international and local naval networks and forces. The
development and implementation of different security missions are also coordinated
through the facilities. Hence, empowerment of individual states plays a central role in
security efforts.

3.2.1 DCoC Mandate in the region
The mandate of the DCoC is based on the guidelines provided by IMO, and the nations
around the Western Indian Ocean and the Arabian Gulf are parties to the IMO
agreements. Consequently, DCoC-related capacity building is carried out via IMO’s
Technical Cooperation Committee (TCC) and Maritime Safety Committee (MSC).
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Countries in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden leverages in this
cooperation and takes part in different ways to strengthen local maritime legislations
and ensure their implementation. For instance, countries such as Djibouti and Kenya
have continuously updated their maritime laws to match the updated Code to improve
their counter-insecurity measures and enlarge to cover more areas of illicit and
criminal activities including illegal fishing and human trafficking. The capacity
building under DCoC, especially via training integrates different international tools.
East African nations through their various Marine Science and Security centers have
benefited from the DCoC led maritime security activities and training. The training
provides via the partnership between IMO and DCoC aligns with the global metrics,
which helps to adhere to the international standards. Part of the training activities
includes security responses such as investigations and prosecution as outlined by
DCoC and through the existing national laws.
Evidently, signatories of the DCoC also takes part in different conferences and
workshops geared towards enhancing the process of implementing security at sea
legislations organized by DCoC. Indeed, the signatory states applies the training
offered during these meetings to strength local security efforts and also increase their
overall efficiency in maritime management. For example, almost all nations around
the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden such as Saudi Arabia and Kenya have
established Commercial Maritime legislations to guide their maritime activities and
oversee different entities involved in sea activities. Different countries are also taking
part in different operations of the DCoC depending in individual interests and needs.
For instance, India and Saudi Arabia have been heavily involved in sponsoring training
of African Countries. The DCoC also gives mandate to specific nations to help create
or enhance the maritime security preparedness of other signatories. The preparedness
include investigation at sea procedures, interdiction activities and technical training.
The International Maritime Organization is also actively involved in the organization
and sponsorship of these programs. Therefore, countries with higher capacity hold
higher position at DCoC and IMO in terms of spearheading security programs and
efforts. Overall, the DCoC has helped to increase the capacity of members in Western
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Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden to investigate, deter, arrest and charge criminal
and illicit activities at sea including human and drug trafficking, piracy, illegal fishing,
and armed robbery, among others.

3.3

The Effectiveness of CMF Compared to DCoC against insecurity

Both the Djibouti Code of Conduct and the Combined Maritime Force have played a
critical role in the fight against insecurity in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of
Aden. However, the Combined Maritime Force (CMF) has played a greater role in
combating piracy and armed robbery that had increased significantly in the last decade.
First, unlike the DCoC, the CMF has an active naval force derived from different
countries across the globe. Additionally, the CMF’s operations are supported and led
by key international players such as the United States, Canada, and the European
Union. On the other hand, signatories of the DCoC are derived from Africa and the
Middle East hence lacks the same resources in terms of work force and funding
enjoyed by the CMF (Siebels, 2019). The CMF memberships have developed an
ownership element whereby any country or organization in the world can take part in
the implementation of the agreement. The developed nations such as the United States
and the United Kingdom are greatly involved in ensuring that commercial ships
involved in the international trade are protected against armed robbery and piracy,
among other criminal activities. The less developed members are not obligated to
contribute funds or personnel since the entire arrangement is based on voluntary basis.
The European Union and United States have provided naval hardware and technology,
which has come in hand in combating insecurity around the Somalia corridor. The
funding from the developed and developing economies such as Japan, India, and
Denmark have helped to promote security and ensure sustainability of CMF’s
operations. Most of these funds have been used not only to fund security drills across
the region but also in developing and running intelligence collection centers.

40

3.4

Legal Challenges

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the sea (UNCLOS) is largely involved
in ensuring security at sea through efforts aimed at curbing human trafficking, piracy,
armed robbery, environmental degradation, and illegal fishing, among others.
However, the scope of maritime security means that UNCLOS cannot successes alone.
Additionally, providing a legal framework is not enough in fighting insecurity at sea.
Therefore, UNCLOS has provided guidelines and support for local, regional and
international treaties in relation to maritime security. There are multiple treaties even
at the international levels. Although the body encompass multiple clauses involving
how states deals with maritime insecurity such as Articles 107, 110 and 100, the body
has failed to provide clear guidance or reference point for private firms involved in the
fight against maritime crimes. In reality, this has led to creation of multiple fragmented
legal principles, conventions, and agreements that narrows down to UNCLOS. Despite
the UNCLOS establishing a still legal foundation of maritime jurisdiction and areas,
the framework is blind to some non-state maritime security operations, especially
those relating to piracy.

In its place, a set of confusing, overlapping, and often conflicting local and
international standards, laws, and policies have come up in effort to regulate the
industry. According to the United Nations, the rigidity of UNCLOS is deliberate to
provide a solid legal ground. Despite this reason, having a dynamic legal framework
is important to ensure that it adapts to the rapidly shifting maritime environment. The
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA)
Protocol was created to bridge the gaps in the international legislations needed to
reduce or eliminate threats to security of navigation, commerce and human life at sea.
The protocol requires governments to develop laws against terrorism and piracy
activities based on the national legislations. The SUA protocol is based on the 1988
and 2005 frameworks. The 1988 version maintain that countries hold the responsibility
to create jurisdiction to charge or extradite perpetrators of maritime crimes even when
the crimes were carried out outside their territorial waters.
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Different from the UNCLOS view of piracy that just emphasizes on the high waters
and hence merely permits security reactions in the high waters, the 1988 framework
illegalizes piracy-like acts against ships that have travelled away from the territorial
water are planned to travel beyond the jurisdiction. A major limitation of the 1988
SUA framework is that it only gives flag states the needed power to react to threats
against ships displaying their specific flag. The SUA framework of 2005 is an
amendment to that of 1988 and covers three areas including the use of vessels as means
of conducting maritime crimes. It also covers the production of dangerous weapons on
international waters. The third section covers the transportation of suspects of
terrorism in high waters under the anti-terrorism laws of the United Nations. More so,
the 2005 version extended the jurisdiction of states to encompass third states against
the previous version that only included the flag states.

Therefore, the new version has broadened the scope of defining criminal activities
against ships beyond UNCLOS, expanding the legal latitude of nations to pursue
perpetrators and reduce attacks at sea. Clearly, having a wider perspective of the SUA
protocol it is clear that it emphasizes on the need for treaties against maritime threats.
The guidelines and protocols for private measures against maritime insecurity are
based on IMO instruments including SOLAS. The safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) Convention, was created in the 1910s to enhance the safety of maritime
vessels after the Titanic situation. The Convention provides the best practice in the
construction and operations of ships for increased safety. The SOLAS’ control
standards are compulsory for both port and flag states. However, SOLAS has also
created a legal dilemma when dealing with private security at sea. First, there is a
question of whether having private or independent contractors on board ships limits
the overall obligation of the ship owners under the Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS
convention. This has left individual States to establish additional legislations to guide
the relationship between these private personnel and the ship owners or organizations.
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For instance, the Baltic International Maritime Council (BIMCO), which is one of the
main shipping associations in the world, has designed guidelines for contract in order
to create boundaries between the obligations of ship owners against private security
contractors. Although SOLAS has detailed the responsibilities of ship owners when it
comes to flag states, a majority of cases involving private security firms has shown
that they tend to ignore the orders or guidelines of the ship-owners when faced by
dangerous situations. Instead, the private firms focus on defending their lives and that
of the crewmembers, which is aright guaranteed in various international legal
frameworks including the Human Right Charter. The guidelines provided by BIMCO
under GUARDCON strive to remove this dilemma by providing a contract between
ship owners and independent contractors. This include allowing the private contractors
to react to situations with necessarily taking orders from the ship owners and to reduce
the liability of the ship-owners in case the private contractors’ acts are in violation of
the SOLAS protocol. Additionally, SOLAS has given port states the mandate to block
maritime vessels from sailing when safety is in doubt in order to protect property,
crew, and the marine environment. The SOLAS convention continues to be expanded
for increased maritime security through individual regulations, including ISM and
ISPS, among others.

In conclusion, the global legislation framework provides detailed clauses to deal with
maritime insecurity in areas such as piracy, human and drug trafficking, illegal fishing,
production and use of weapons of mass destruction, and armed robbery, among others.
Regardless of the notable limitations that could create legal dilemma, the global
agreements and recommendations creates a good ground when creating more specific
or customized regional and local legislations. One of the key sources of the regional
and local legislations is the International Maritime Organization (IMO) since it
contains specific clauses relating to maritime safety and security, including dealing
with armed robbery and piracy against ships. Nevertheless, other agreements and
protocols such as UNCLOS, SUA, HC, and OCC can be used to deal with armed
robbery, piracy and terrorism at sea based on specific provisions. The International
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legislation gives countries or States, power to identity and maritime offense, illegalize
it, and prosecute perpetrators. The international legal framework also provides
procedures in relation to the implementation measures, global collaboration,
safeguarding of human rights, and prevention of crime.
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CHAPTER IV

4. Discussion
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has been playing a critical role in
establishing guidelines and recommendations for maritime activities and for its
members. In regards to maritime insecurity affecting ships, it has created
recommendations and tools that can aid in the operational response in areas such as
minimization of risk and information acquisition in the fight against armed robbery,
piracy, and other criminal activities at sea. IMO has facilitated the creation of different
maritime cooperation agreements as part of the efforts to combat insecurity. Initially,
countries relied on the law of the sea and individual government efforts to deal with
these insecurities. Notably, a few decades ago, criminal and illicit activities such as
piracy and human trafficking occurred on small scale so it was easier for individual
governments to deal with them at a local level. However, the rapid globalization and
entry of more sophisticated criminal groups has increased the need for collaboration
both at the national, regional, and international levels to curb insecurities at sea. The
maritime vessels affected by criminal activities, particularly armed robbery and piracy
are those transporting valued goods including rare minerals and crude oil. Any attack
on these vessels is likely to cause immense economic losses to the stakeholders. This
has given birth to collaboration agreements and security operations such as DCoC and
the CMF. The important of the DCoC and CMF as security instruments has been
evident due to their success in reducing piracy and armed robbery incidence in Western
Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.

4.1

Robustness of DCoC

The DCoC has cemented cooperation among the different states within the Western
Indian Ocean. Apart from IMO, the African Union, INTERPOL, the European Union,
the UN Offices on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the African regional economic
communities, among others, also support the Djibouti Code of Conduct. Under the
guidance of DCoC, all the signatories have established facilities to increase their
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capacity to deter and respond to maritime insecurity (Weldemichael, 2017). The goal
is to have central systems where intelligence related to criminal activities such as
piracy and drug trafficking can be shared. This intelligence can be assessed and
evaluated on regional and national levels to facilitate transnational operations and
related strategic development. Therefore, the initial stage of DCoC involved building
the capacity of the member states in order to increase maritime safety and security
under the Critical Maritime Routes program of the European Union (Menzel, 2018).
The second and ongoing phase of the DCoC is a model of training based on IMO
guidelines through the Djibouti Regional Center.

One of the main problems affecting the operations of DCoC is the lack of a central
political body to oversee its activities. This means that the code lacks the necessary
political good will since it has no political responsibility or mandate against nations in
the region. This has led to delays in some of its security projects, particularly when
dealing with uncooperative nations such as Iran (Weldemichael, 2017). To counter this
problem, the DCoC has recently updated its mandate and security tools. The revision
covered multiple areas including coordination and partnership in the execution of the
security tools based on the recommendations of the signatory states. This has increase
the effectiveness of DCoC as a key security instrument, especially dealing with piracy
and armed robbery in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (Menzel, 2018).
The Code has succeeded in increasing sharing of information among members and
increase cooperation between the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa. The Code has
created a strong ground for technical partnership among different parties including
international bodies, signatory nations, and others. Therefore, DCoC is vigorous in the
region despite the political and financial challenges. In regards to financial limitation,
the DCoC often run on a budget of less than 9 million US dollars (Menzel, 2018). The
budget is too tight considering the extensive security operations needed in the region.
Additionally, the Code lacks a stable source of income since it has to rely on donor
funding from nations such as the Netherlands and Japan. Nevertheless, the DCoC has
continued to receive substantial support from NATO and the European Union in areas
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such as training of signatory states, particularly in relation to collection of intelligence,
arrest, and prosecution of suspects at sea. The commitment of signatory states
continues to increase, which favours the efforts of the code. For instance, Saudi Arabia
has contributed in capacity building through its Border Guards Academy dedicated to
Marine Science and Security, which is dedicated to the entire region. Consequently,
increased cooperation and support has contributed immensely to strengthening antipiracy efforts despite the limited funds. In 2017, the signatory states also made
important changes to the code to make it more fitted to lead the development of blue
economy in the region. This includes safeguarding of the marine ecosystem to enhance
the standards of living of local people and for overall economic development of the
region. Each signatory state is expected to establish a clear national plan to aid
maritime security and the growth of blue economy. The goal is to increase stability,
revenue and creates jobs in the region while ensuring that the marine environment is
safe and secure in the long-term (Menzel, 2018). The DCoC has shown its robustness
due to its ability to achieve its mandate despite the myriad of challenges. Therefore,
the code as a security instrument is not only compatible with the national legislations
and efforts but also sustainable.

The ability of the code to adapt to future changes is evident from the amendments done
under the DCoC+. The amendments mean that the code covers more transitional
crimes at sea including narcotics, human trafficking, illegal dumping of poisonous
waste, trafficking of arms, illegal wildlife trade, theft, smuggling, and illegal oil
bunkering, among others. The 2018 Jeddah amendments also reveal the increasing
importance of DCoC in the region due to its role in curbing crime and other illicit
activities in the region.

4.2

Robustness of CMF

The nature of the existing threats to maritime security has evolved over the years. The
now common threats such as illegal fishing, piracy, smuggling of drugs, armed
robbery, unregulated fishing, smuggling firearms, and trafficking of immigrants were
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less rampant before the 21st century. Additionally, the threats were less common
around the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden regions. Hence, a multilateral
security instrument such as CMF has become necessary in effort to combat these
threats. CMF provides a more comprehensive approach to achieving security and
safety at sea both in the local and international waters. The robustness of CMF is
demonstrated by its founding standards that govern its contracting parties, signatories,
and other stakeholders. The signatories to CMF are required to align their maritime
legislations and policies with the basic principles or standards of CMF for sustainable
outcome. In scenarios where the utilization of the CMF’s standards is not technically
possible, the CMF agreements appear to provide solutions to help minimize the
dilemma (Mukherjee, 2020). The CMF covers almost all the criminal and illicit
activities that may threaten security at sea such as illegal fishing, terrorism, and human
and arm trafficking. The continued amendment of the CMF shows that the instrument
is dynamic and flexible enough to cater for different circumstances as they arise. The
robustness of the instrument is evident from its framework or design, which is
characterized by multiple divisions.

The strategy used by the CMF to address insecurity in the Western Indian Ocean and
the Gulf of Aden is largely sustainable, especially considering that it has its own naval
forces derived from different parts of the world. Consequently, the CMF is able to
cover a large scope of the territorial waters of its signatories and the most affected
areas of the international waters. A good example is CMF’s successful operations
around the horn of Africa, particularly the Somalia corridor (Vespe et al., 2015). Like
the DCoC, the CMF is playing a significant role in capacity building and enhancing
cooperation among nations in the region. Furthermore, CMF has also been able to
break political barriers by ensuring that even non-members are part of the cooperation
efforts. This has been every important in fighting piracy and armed robbery, especially
along the waters of the politically unstable Somalia. Therefore, CMF is not only
politically and economically robust and capable but also successful at the geographic
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level as it continues to enhance national and international collaboration against
criminal and illicit activities (Upadhyaya, 2014).

The multiagency nature of the CMF composition gives it the necessary support needed
to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in curbing maritime insecurities in the region.
The multiagency network comprises of international organizations, national
governments, and other bodies. As the signatory government facilitates and provides
a favourable environment for the implementation of the CMF’s strategies through
national and regional legislations, the maritime force continues to provide the needed
capacity for better security outcome. Clearly, the absence of CMF involvement would
make it almost impossible for individual nations or even the region to counter the
rapidly evolving armed robbery and pirate activities (Bueger & Stockbruegger, 2016).
Furthermore, the presence of the combined maritime forces gives the region a technical
advantage against the heavily armed criminals operating in territorial or around
territorial maritime environments. For example, despite countries such as Tanzania
and Somalia being members of the Combined Maritime Force since its creation, their
contribution in terms of funding has been limited. In fact, most of the African countries
around the region lack both the funds and skilled personnel to fight criminal and illicit
activities in their territories. Due to these circumstances, CMF works with elite
international bodies such as the European Union, NATO, and Interpol to facilitate
communication in terms of collecting sharing intelligence to enhance maritime
security (Mukherjee, 2020). Therefore, the strength and effectiveness of CMF is
evident and its robustness is captured by the significant decrease in piracy and related
criminal activities.

4.3

DCoC and CMF’s approaches

DCoC and CMF share multiple goals including combating insecurities at sea due to
criminal activities such as armed robbery and piracy. Evidently, CMF and DCoC
provide transnational and regional approaches to combating maritime insecurities
since they comprise of both local and international governments and bodies. The
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diverse approach gives them a strong foundation in dealing with armed robbery and
piracy in Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. The region had become one of
the notorious corridors for pirates due to its economic and strategic importance as an
international trade route, oil production and fishing. The multilateral approach of the
DCoC and CMF offers a proper framework based on its operations and guidelines on
how to investigate, process, arrest and prosecute perpetrators of maritime crimes. More
so, the coordination and joint operations facilitated by the CMF and DCoC goes a long
way to ensuring that individual states have significant capacity to contribute to the
security of the region.
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CHAPTER V
5. Conclusion and Recommendation
Insecurity in the maritime territories has existed for centuries, but the recent years have
experienced a significant increase in armed robbery and piracy against ships traversing
the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Insecurity has destabilizing impacts
on corporations, governments, and the overall region. Initially, the region had to rely
on the global agreements established in the 20th century, despite the continued
evolution of maritime crimes. The Djibouti Code of conduct has provided tool that can
comprehensively increase capacity of the signatory states to minimize or even
eliminate insecurity at Sea. Some of the key tools used by DCoC in capacity building
include intelligence sharing, policies and training. As a result, states within the
Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden can take advantage of DCoC’s experience
to improve national and regional legislations related to security and safety at Sea.
Specifically, the countries in region can utilize the different policies established by
DCoC to either improve or replace their inefficient maritime legislations to help deal
with the dynamic challenges affecting the maritime industry.

The enhancement of local legislations will help the legislations of signatory states to
match global standards aimed to safeguard international and territorial waters.
Ensuring that the local legislations match the international policies will ensure
effective response to illegal and illicit activities in the region when the laws are
invoked. This means that the signatories of DCoC in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO)
and the Gulf of Aden can establish their individual procedures without bypassing the
international requirements. As the global economic environment continues to change,
various changes at the local level also continue to be experienced. The advancement
in technology and the ongoing globalization has contributed to increased
interconnection of regions and people. In the shipping sector, the linkage exists via the
emergence of technological tools together with globally and locally established
information sharing areas to enhance security at sea. Consequently, the WIO and the
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Gulf of Aden should exploit the current instruments and tools provided by both the
CMF and the DCoC to enhance its maritime polices and laws to match the current and
emerging security challenges.

Furthermore, the shifts will ensure that the regions are not left behind in relations to
safeguarding its maritime interests. Hence, the region must use DCoC and CMF as a
reference point or blueprint in improving its maritime legislations via a strategic
incorporation. The tools are consistently updated to ensure that current and ongoing
security issues such as armed robbery and piracy at sea are addressed. The DCoC and
CMF should also continue to improve the policy structures of the WIO and the Gulf
of Aden, but based on a careful plan to ensure that political issues do not overtake the
priorities of security. This will demand increased investment in analytical and
individual capacities, together with technologies that are likely to fit well in relation
to the local needs. Considering the unavailability of financial resources, together with
the increasing interests of global partners, more focus should be on strengthening the
bargaining power of individual nations through regional cohesion.

Considering the wide scope of the challenges affecting the region, the DCoC and the
CMF can do more to improve maritime security and safety in the WIO and the Gulf
of Aden. First, the DCoC and CMF should focus on increasing the Pan-African
agenda. The two organizations should not only focus on international interests but also
instead incorporate the priorities and needs of countries in the region. The CMF in
particular should instead of continuing to fund naval operations should allocations
towards having strong policies and stable political environment. Therefore, the DCoC
and CMF needs to refocus, increase commitments, and concentrate on improving the
living standards of people in the region. This will help minimize the factors such as
poverty and unequal distribution or maritime income, which pushes people to engage
in illicit and illegal maritime activities, or political unrest. Clearly, empowering people
through increased economic participation will be a step in the right direction for CMF
and DCoC in the region. Secondly, the CMF and DCoC should diversify their
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strategies when dealing with insecurity in the area. The two bodies have mostly relied
on information gathering, military operations, and training on various maritime issues.
For a change, the DCoC should include maritime research, industrial development,
promoting education and cultural activities, establish best policies for growth of the
blue economy, and weather and climate change monitoring, and green energy issues.
Establishing more and non-military operations and working with local government and
other agencies will make the CMF and DCoC more relevant and effective in the region.
Creating friendly, accommodative, and supportive links has proved successful in other
industries.

DCoC has established policies to help its members to develop and increase their
benefits via the blue economy. However, increased partnership on Blue Economy is
needed, especially at time when interests on the maritime resources among most
countries around the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden are increasing. The
African Union (AU) recently declared the importance of Blue economy in helping
African Nations to speed-up their development. Additionally, the African Integrated
Maritime Strategy 2050 (AIMS) and the 2063 African Union Agenda insist on the
importance of maritime resources towards the overall local and global economy. The
Island nations around the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden such as
Mauritius and Seychelles were listed among the key stakeholders and beneficiaries of
the blue economy, especially considering that their people derive livelihood from the
seas. Currently and through the support of the DCoC, countries such as South Africa,
Kenya, Mauritius and Seychelles have established Ocean guards to safeguard their
blue economy interests. The blue economy efforts under the DCoC are also grounded
on mutual partnership among the African littorals. The DCoC and the CMF should
focus on increasing the capacity of countries in the WIO and Gulf of Aden to use
innovative technology. This may include wastewater recycling, marine-based green
energy production, and water reuse, tidal and wave energy production, conversion of
salty water to drinkable water and sustainable harvesting of nutrient-rich seafoods, and
sustainable management of the sea ecosystem.
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One of the clear places where the DCoC and the CMF have succeeded in their efforts
to increase maritime security in WIO and the Gulf of Aden is in strengthening
collaboration among countries in the region with the aim of increasing capacity
building. The networks have the capacity to sustain and improve inter-personal ties in
the region. Usually, the effect of such networks is long-term and almost impossible to
measure. Nevertheless, they are critical for the growth of different agencies involved
in maritime security and related systems. Research on regional cooperation has
revealed that the importance of interpersonal ties between countries and individuals
plays a critical role. The education and training provide by different agencies of the
CMF and DCoC, especially under the guidelines of the International Maritime
Organization creates intra-regional communities and offer skills on maritime security.
Such communities may further create environments suitable for integration where
intelligence can be shared.

Overall, the CMF appears to have been successful in ensuring security in the WIO and
the Gulf of Aden region through increased strategic naval or military operations while
the DCoC has been effective by establishing key maritime policies and increasing local
and regional cooperation. However, to increase their effectiveness, the CMF and
DCoC should establish multilateral security framework for the region. Increased
cooperation among the countries in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden
will help minimize CMF and DCoC’s over reliant on donor funding and political
goodwill. Establishing a stronger and more local security framework will help not only
reduce insecurity but also cater for the interests of the signatory states. The CMF and
DCoC should also build more Information Fusion Centers (IFC-IOR) in the region and
integrate them with the international centers. This will make the response to insecurity
more effective and contribute immensely towards attaining Security and Growth in the
region. The IFC-IOR centers should align their activities with other security
mechanisms in the region including the Regional Operations Center (RCOC), which
is currently situated in Seychelles. Countries within the region are also signatories to
different international maritime organizations and treaties. Overall, all the
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organizations and treaties are targeted towards reducing the risks of insecurity
affecting the maritime tourism and transport to improve international cooperation and
trade.
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